though he thinks it is unhelpful by itself, seeing that it leaves quite open what it is, more specifically, to live well. To be eudaimôn, then, according to Aristotle -and, he claims, according to almost everyone else (1095a17-18) -is simply for one's life to go well, and his task in the Ethics is to pin down more precisely what that consists in. The English word 'happy' does not precisely correspond to this, although no single English word will do better as a translation. Happiness does not necessarily have to do with living well in general; we can speak of being happy at an instant -the question 'are you happy now?' is perfectly sensible in some contexts. But there is also a prominent usage of the English word 'happy' where it does refer to a state in which, at least from one's own perspective, one's life in general is going well; 'are you happy?' can very well mean something like 'is your life working out for you as you would wish?', not 'do you feel content right now?' When I speak of happiness interchangeably with eudaimonia, then, I will be using it in this more general sense; in this usage 'happiness' is at least a serviceable translation for the Greek word, even if (for reasons we will get to) still not a perfect one. But since it is not perfect, I will also continue to use both the noun eudaimonia and the adjective eudaimôn on a regular basis.
If eudaimonia, per se, refers simply to one's life going well, it may seem unsurprising that all the major ancient Greek sceptics, of both the Academic and the Pyrrhonist traditions, speak of eudaimonia as something the sceptic aspires to along with everyone else. For ancient philosophy in general, unlike much philosophy today, has an essentially practical character; one's philosophy is something that affects the way one lives one's life -or at the very least, must be capable of being incorporated into one's life. Certainly this is how the ancient sceptics conceived it. And so one way for them to recommend their philosophical outlook was to insist that that outlook not only could be incorporated into one's life, but also resulted in one's life going well -in other words, in
eudaimonia.
For the Academics Arcesilaus and Carneades, as reported by Sextus Empiricus, the topic of happiness seems to arise in the context of a response to the familiar apraxia objection: how is it even possible to live as a sceptic? In particular, how is it possible for someone who claims to hold no beliefs about the nature of things to make choices between alternative courses of action? Arcesilaus responds, according to Sextus, by saying that the sceptic's choices will be based on what is 'reasonable' (M 7.158) , and that by choosing and acting in this way he will achieve happiness, which is also identifiedthough Sextus does not explicitly present this as part of what Arcesilaus himself said -as the end (telos) of life. And Carneades responds with an elaborate account of a decision procedure based on 'persuasive appearances' (M 7.166-89) ; persuasiveness, it is pointed out, comes in different levels, and it is the highest level of persuasiveness that is said to be appropriate for 'matters that pertain to happiness ' (184) . Again it is possible that the reference to happiness is Sextus', not Carneades' own; but there is no particular reason to think so. The details of both Arcesilaus' and Carneades' arguments are complicated and a matter of much debate. There is also a difficult question as to whether they intend these arguments as their own, or whether they are telling their opponents, in a purely dialectical spirit, what they ought to think about these issues 1 . But whatever the answers to these questions, it looks as if both these Academics are concerned to show that happiness is just as feasible on sceptical principles as on non-sceptical ones.
The Pyrrhonists go further. Not only are they much more explicit than the Academics that happiness is something sceptics secure for themselves (and for anyone else who comes to accept their message). They also consistently portray the Pyrrhonist as better off in this respect than everyone else -or at least, than other philosophers; the Pyrrhonists are happy, and philosophers of other persuasions are not. This appears to be the case -although the evidence is fragmentary -even in the earliest phase of and 'Whether the person who suspends judgement about the nature of good and bad things is in all respects happy' (141-67). The chapter titles in Sextus are generally thought to be his own, but in any case these titles accurately capture the chapters'
contents. The answer to the first question, unsurprisingly, is 'no'. The reason is that if, unlike the sceptic, one believes that certain things are by nature good and others by nature bad, that will vastly increase the level of one's anxiety. One will be obsessed about acquiring, or holding on to, the good things, and about ridding oneself, and keeping oneself rid, of the bad things. The sceptic, on the other hand, who lacks any beliefs of the form 'X is by nature good/bad', is free from all such turmoil, and hence, as Sextus says, 'it is scepticism's achievement to procure the happy life' (140). He immediately goes on to characterize happiness explicitly as tranquillity: 'That person is happy who conducts himself without disturbance' (141).
The answer to the second question -and this is perhaps a little more surprisingis also 'no'. Sextus distinguishes between matters of opinion and matters of necessity.
The sceptic lacks all opinions (doxai) -and in particular, opinions to the effect that certain things are by nature good or bad -and so, as we just saw, is free from all the associated troubles; as far as these matters are concerned, then, the sceptic is 'perfectly happy' (147). But, as he says (143), there are certain things that just happen to us, no matter what we do or do not believe, such as hunger, thirst or pain; and to these things the sceptic is just as vulnerable as everyone else. Since they do cause disturbance to sceptics as well as to others, it follows that on this score the sceptic is not 'perfectly happy'. But even here, Sextus argues, the sceptic does better than others as far as happiness -that is, ataraxia -is concerned. For other people, when in pain, have an additional source of trouble besides the pain itself: they also hold the opinion that pain is bad by nature. The sceptic, on the other hand, simply feels the pain. Indeed, Sextus even says that the opinion may be worse than the pain itself; for this reason someone watching a surgery (an ancient surgery, that is, without anaesthetic) may actually suffer more than the patient (159) 3 . Thus the sceptic's state with regard to these matters of necessity, while admittedly not one of ataraxia, is one of 'moderate feeling' (161), as opposed to violent disturbance;
here too, then, the sceptic's level of happiness is higher than that of the non-sceptic, even if it falls short of full-scale happiness.
Here Sextus is setting himself in opposition (deliberately, I suspect) to both Stoics and Epicureans. The Stoics held that everything except virtue and vice were indifferent;
3 Sextus also suggests, in terms that seem borrowed from the Epicureans, that these kinds of inevitable suffering are not as bad as usually supposed. But this seems irrelevant to the question whether the sceptic is better off than others; and the same can be said of other arguments employed in this section (150-61). The one I have just described in the main text is at least pertinent, even if not convincing. For discussion, see Bett (1997) (DL 9.67) . But despite adopting a position that is, in important respects, less ambitious than those of either the figurehead of Pyrrhonism or the two major nonsceptical schools, he does insist that the sceptic does better than the non-sceptic, in terms of the achievement of happiness, when it comes to pain and other forms of inevitable suffering -in addition, again, to fully achieving it (whereas his opponents do not achieve it at all) when it comes to matters of opinion.
-II - Again we have the combination of ataraxia in matters of opinion and moderate feeling in matters over which we have no control; again we have the contention that the sceptic is better off in these respects, because belief that things are by nature good or bad brings turmoil; and again we have the example of the onlooker at a surgery fainting because of the belief that what is happening is bad, while the patient maintains his calm . Ataraxia also comes up in the crucial one-sentence description of scepticism and its effects that occurs near the beginning of the first book; 'The skeptical ability', Sextus says, 'is one that creates oppositions among things that appear and things that are thought in any way whatever, an ability from which we arrive, because of the equal strength in the opposing objects and accounts, first at suspension of judgement, and after that at tranquility [ataraxia]' (1.8). And the same combination of ataraxia and moderate feeling figures in the opening chapters of the first book as the sceptic's telos, or ultimate aim in life, characterized by Sextus as follows: 'We say up to now that that the sceptic's telos is ataraxia in things relating to opinion and moderate feeling in things that are forced on us'
(1.25). We also find the same claim that belief in things that are good or bad by nature works against the achievement of this telos; 'for the person who has the opinion that there is something by nature fine or bad is continually in turmoil' (1.27 -the claim is elaborated in 27-30).
Clearly, then, Sextus has not changed his mind about the general character of a sceptic's life and why it is preferable to a non-sceptic's life. But he now chooses to express this view without any reference to the notion of eudaimonia. So it looks as if he now sees something problematic about it, from a sceptic's point of view 6 . What might this be?
We have seen that the sceptic avoids beliefs of the form 'X is by nature good/bad'. And this, of course, is just one aspect of a more general avoidance of belief that defines the sceptical attitude. How far this avoidance extends has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate 7 . But it is clear that the sceptic avoids at least all beliefs having to do with the real nature of things. So one way to refine the question just posed is to ask whether there is anything in the notion of eudaimonia that commits one to beliefs about the real nature of things. A number of possibilities may spring to mind. Before we get to these, however, it is worth noting that if there is a problem for the sceptics here, it is a problem that may not apply to the Academic sceptics. As we saw, one way to read prefer the sceptics' combination of ataraxia and moderate feeling to the anguish and obsession of the non-sceptics. And I expect you would too, if you tried it. But that is not to say that the sceptic's attitude is in some objective sense better than that of the nonsceptic. If I believed that, I would certainly be a victim of self-refutation, since beliefs about some things being better, in the nature of things, than others is precisely the source of the non-sceptics' trouble. But to express a preference, and to invite someone else to see whether he or she shares it, is not to commit oneself in any way to an objective or impartial ranking'.
A similar worry might seem to arise when one considers the usual association, in
Greek philosophy, between eudaimonia and the telos. As I said at the outset, eudaimonia at its most general seems to consist in one's life going well, whatever that might amount to. Now, the telos, or goal of life, is generally understood as being that towards which one's life should be, or naturally is, aiming; hence the near-identity between the concepts of the telos and the highest good, that in terms of which all other things are ultimately judged good or not good. On this kind of picture, for one's life to go well is for one to achieve, or be well on the road to achieving, the telos. Annas (1993), 426. as what the sceptic aims for, and in this context one can even use the word telos, 'end' -which is normally loaded with similar theoretical baggage -without venturing beyond a strictly sceptical outlook. But if one offers this state aimed for by the sceptic as a specification of eudaimonia, one is no longer a true sceptic.
There is another, related reason why a sceptic might be ill advised to adopt the notion of eudaimonia for his own use. This can be seen by looking at the attitude expressed towards it by the Cyrenaics, a school in some ways akin to scepticism, but which Sextus (PH 1.215) emphasizes is different from scepticism as he understands it (as he does with numerous other philosophers and schools with which scepticism might be confused). The Cyrenaics are said to have denied that eudaimonia is the telos. According to Diogenes Laertius's summary of their views, 'It seems to them that the end is different from happiness. For the end is particular pleasure, while happiness is the whole compounded of particular pleasures, in which both past and future pleasures are counted together. And particular pleasure is worth choosing for its own sake, whereas happiness is worth choosing not for its own sake, but for the sake of the particular pleasures' (2.87-8, cf. Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.544aff.). Along similar lines, one particular sub-group of Cyrenaics, the followers of Anniceris, are said to have denied that there is a telos for the whole of life at all, instead claiming that each action has as its own end the pleasure that results from it (Clement, . What these passages seem to suggest is that eudaimonia is something that, by its very nature, applies to the long term, perhaps even to one's life as a whole. The Cyrenaics prefer not to concentrate their attention on the long term, but on immediate particular pleasures; and for this reason eudaimonia is not what they pursue as the telos. There is room for disagreement about how radically the Cyrenaics depart from standard assumptions of Greek ethics, including its broadly 'eudaimonist' framework; eudaimonia is, after all, mentioned in the Diogenes passage as something worth choosing, albeit not directly 12 . But the clear implication of these texts is that a concern for eudaimonia -a concern about which the Cyrenaics are expressing at least some degree of reservation -is a concern for one's long-term well-being rather than with the immediate present. Indeed, this should not be surprising in light of the point with which we began: that eudaimonia, according to the common understanding, amounts to one's life in general going well. In addition, the notion in the Diogenes passage of a 'whole compounded of' particular pleasures may suggest that one's life must be structured (in some unspecified manner) if it is to qualify as going well; the word sustêma, which I have translated as 'whole compounded', often (though not always) has the connotation of an ordered whole -a system, in fact -not just a random collection.
But if the Cyrenaics are wary of the notion of eudaimonia, it seems clear that the sceptics should be as well -albeit for somewhat different reasons. The Cyrenaics' wariness may derive from doubts about our ability to plan for the long term, or perhaps, more radically, from a lack of concern about any time other than the present 13 . For the sceptics, on the other hand, the idea that what humans ought to do is develop a properly structured life over the long term would surely be another piece of theoretical baggage, one from which they would have good reason to distance themselves. Indeed, the Pyrrhonists' stock phrase 'up to now' indicates precisely the opposite of a concern for long-term structure in one's life; Pyrrhonists act according to how things have struck them so far, without assuming that things will continue in an orderly way as before.
(Such an assumption would, after all, amount to a definite position.) And so, to the extent that a concern for the long term and for a structure to one's life are built into the very concept of eudaimonia -as the Cyrenaics' suspicion of it seems to suggest, and as is consistent with the tenor of much other Greek ethics 14 -the sceptics might very well wish 13 For some considerations in favor of this more radical interpretation, see the final section of O'Keefe (2002). 14 The best-known example of this tendency is of course Aristotle's phrase 'in a complete life' (NE 1098a18) appended to his characterization of the human good. Unless Aristotle changes his mind, he cannot literally mean an entire lifetime; for he later admits that someone might be happy at one time and then lose his happiness, and even possibly -though this would be very difficultregain it later (1101a9-13). But as his explanatory remarks make clear, a 'complete life' is at least a substantial period of time.
to avoid it; for them, unlike the Cyrenaics, the problem is not that it incorporates mistaken theoretical assumptions, but that it incorporates theoretical assumptions at all.
Let us return to my original question: can an ancient Greek sceptic be eudaimôn?
The answer, I think, is not entirely straightforward. It is not impossible that a sceptic (not, of course, through any deliberate choice) might happen to live the kind of life that, according to some other school's account of eudaimonia, would qualify as eudaimôn.
This is in fact not going to happen in most cases, given that such specifications of eudaimonia will usually include a component of definite belief that would be anathema to a sceptic. This is clearly true of the Stoic specification, and presumably of the Aristotelian one. But perhaps the sceptic -assuming he did indeed achieve ataraxiamight qualify as eudaimôn as conceived by an Epicurean, albeit via a different route from the one laid down by the Epicureans themselves. For the Epicureans aimed at pleasure, and understood this to consist in ataraxia; and while the Epicureans, unlike the Pyrrhonists, took the route to ataraxia to involve the adoption of certain beliefs about the world, it is not clear that they saw the state of ataraxia as itself incorporating any element of belief. What a sceptic would be advised not to do, if I am right, is himself lay claim to the achievement of eudaimonia, and include it as a component of the sceptical outlook in a role parallel to the one it occupies in other philosophies; for, as we have seen, the very concept seems to bring with it a number of theoretical presuppositions that one would expect a sceptic to want to avoid. And this, I suspect, is why Sextus decided not to use it in Outlines of Pyrrhonism, even though he had done so in Against the Ethicists.
-IIIIf a sceptic cannot claim to be eudaimôn (even if he might conceivably be so by someone else's lights), can he claim to be happy? In other words, do modern notions of happiness have the same kinds of theoretical presuppositions that we have noted in the Greek term eudaimonia? Not entirely, at any rate. As I noted at the outset, the English sentence 'Are you happy?' (and I believe this is replicated at least to some extent in other modern languages) can sometimes be asking simply for a sounding of one's current state of feeling; and there is no problem in a sceptic giving a definite answer -which will sometimes be a positive answer -to this. However, as we saw, 'Are you happy?' can also be used to ask whether a person considers his or her life in general to be going well. Here, I think, the sceptic's ability to answer the question (in the affirmative, or at all) is not so obvious. And here there is a possible lesson for us today 15 .
To return to something suggested earlier, the very idea of someone's life going well assumes an ability to rank lives on some scale of success. Presumably, on any account, this ranking must be somehow related to actual human needs, interests and preferences. And for the many people today, both in and out of philosophy, who reject any kind of objective values -which are perhaps a kind of modern analogue of the idea from which Sextus distances himself, the idea of things being good or bad by nature -the notion of a person's life going well will clearly have to be construed in terms of the degree of satisfaction of some such set of needs, interests and preferences (whether these are understood as specific to that individual, common to all humanity, or something in between). But to pin down, in these terms, what it would be for someone's life to be going well is not easy. We might perhaps want to say that there is no one scale of success -that what counts as life going well for me might be different from what counts as life going well for you. But this seems to introduce the danger that what it is for a life to be going well may be reduced simply to the state of well-being experienced (perhaps over some extended stretch of time) by the person in question. 15 The reflections that follow are very superficial, and are merely intended to point to some implications that the preceding discussion may have beyond the scholarly field of Greek philosophy. In particular, I take no account of the considerable contemporary literature on the subject of happiness, well-being, etc. For a highly provocative recent contribution in this area, which includes references to many other works, see Benatar (2006) White concludes his book by saying that 'we never have or try for a completely and consistently articulated concept of happiness', and that 'in an important sense the history 16 One can also imagine someone reporting dissatisfaction with his or her life, even though we might see it as containing all that one could hope for. But here we may be less inclined to say that the person's life is really going well even though he or she thinks otherwise, because we may see psychic integration, or a positive outlook on one's situation, as itself one component of a life that is going well. 17 See e.g., Kant (1981) , 418-19 (in the original pagination).
of the concept of happiness has been a search for something that's unobtainable' 18 .
Unobtainable not because life is a tragedy, but because it is a confused mess; we just do not have a clear enough idea of what we are looking for.
The World Database of Happiness has for decades been collecting information on people's answers to questions purporting to elicit their level of happiness; nations are ranked overall in terms of happiness, as well as in terms of the degree of inequality of the happiness within them, trends are identified over time, and so on 19 . But it seems fair to ask whether there is any single clear commodity being measured. The questions asked are quite varied, but they usually seem to involve one's placing oneself on a scale; the scales generally have to do either with how one feels (at the moment or over time) or with how well one thinks one's life is going. But scales of the first kind seem to invite the question 'compared with what?'. How one thinks one is feeling, as measured on a scale of one to ten, must depend in part on how one thinks a person ought to feel, or is entitled to feel, or might realistically aspire to feel; it is a commonplace observation that some people are 'glass-half-full' and others 'glass-half-empty' types of people, and people in the first category might well place themselves higher on the scale than people in the second category, even if their current states of feeling were actually identical. And scales of the second kind must depend in part on some general conception of what it means for a life to be going well. It seems highly unlikely that everyone's views on this issue, either, will be the same. It also seems very possible that different national cultures will affect people's views on both issues -so that the answers elicited to the questions in any one nation may be systematically skewed in one direction or another 20 . In addition, it seems highly unlikely that most people's views about how a person may reasonably expect to feel, or about what it means for a life to go well, are well articulated or precise. Indeed, if 18 White (2006); the quoted passages are on pages 169, 173. See also Chekola (2007) .
19 Veenhoven (2010) . 20 Much data, amusingly conveyed, that may seem to support this suspicion can be found in Weiner (2008) . Weiner does not, however, seem to notice any of these deeper issues more than intermittently.
White is right, they may be exceedingly fuzzy. All this casts some doubt on what the World Database of Happiness is a database of. Yet to give the answers that the Database collects does seem to require that a person have some conception of what, in general, a well-lived life is. And so, in answering the questions one is not simply registering states of feeling, but also, implicitly at least, giving voice to values that make some claim to being more than mere expressions of individual preference.
The American political philosopher John Rawls emphasized that the liberal structure of society for which he argued did not impose any one conception of well-being on its citizens, but left them to shape their lives in light of their own conceptions of what a good life would be -provided these conceptions did not interfere with the ability of others to pursue their own conceptions 21 . One problem he faced, and that many contemporary societies face, is that some people's conceptions of the good life have an absolutist quality that requires their adherents to try to impose them on others. But even for those of whom this is not true -those who are willing to 'live and let live' -the very notion of 'the good life' has about it an air of aspiring to universal status; and so there is at least a natural tendency to think of the good life, however one conceives it, as a life that people in general would do best to pursue (if only they had the sense to see it), not merely as a life that one individually happens to prefer 22 . And this is so, I suggest, even if 21 Rawls' classic work is, of course, Rawls (1971) . But the theme to which I refer is much more prominent in the later Rawls (1993) . 22 As Richard Kraut points out, Rawls himself conceives of the good as relative to the agent's plans and desires; see Rawls (1971), 27, and Kraut (2006), 192-3 . My point is simply that this is not how many people think from the inside about their own conception of the good; for them, it feels like (and feels as if it ought to be) something more than a mere set of private plans and desires. Kraut's main aim is to show that Aristotle does not recognize a category of moral rightness, independent of the question what things are good. His purpose in introducing Rawls is that for Rawls, by contrast, a separate category of rightness is crucial, precisely because Rawls conceives of the good as too subjective in character to serve as the foundation for a theory of justice. Aristotle, unlike, Rawls, has no trouble thinking of justice as a good because he does not think of goodness as relative to individual desires or purposes; hence it does not occur to him to seek an altogether different type of value, besides the good, on which to base a theory of justice, or of any other ethically significant characteristic. But if so, then it follows that we cannot easily abandon the general notion of a life that is going well -however disappointed we may be in the project of saying what that amounts to, and however much it may seem to commit us to values of a kind of whose existence many of us are unsure.
Another thing that may be unwelcome about the Pyrrhonist position is that what it recommends is simply a psychological state of contentment. Most of us want something more robust out of life than that, and would consider a life of which that is the highlight to be peculiarly impoverished. Of course, the Pyrrhonists were not the only ones to favor ataraxia; the Epicureans did so as well, and in their case the choice had a considerable theoretical basis. But I think it is fair to say that the recommendation of such a psychological state fits particularly well with an outlook that eschews theory; more ambitious recommendations are liable to invite the question 'why should I bother?', and the answer will get one into the business of justification, which will tend to lead to definite intellectual commitments. Now, this brings me to a final set of ancient/modern comparisons, and perhaps to another angle on the problem we have just been considering. And second, the idea that one ought to maximize the amount of pleasure in the world, as opposed to simply cultivating it oneself, is one that would have struck him as in need of justification; in this latter respect, he is not so different from some modern critics of utilitarianism.
One modern thinker who had something to say about both the utilitarians and the Greek sceptics is Friedrich Nietzsche. And in view of these evident differences between them, it is striking that Nietzsche is critical of both groups, and for somewhat similar reasons. Nietzsche sees the pursuit of tranquility as a sign of a decadent, weary human type, and he associates both the utilitarians and the sceptics with this tendency.
Nietzsche's relation to the Greek sceptics is in fact much more complicated and ambivalent than this 24 ; but his scorn for their ideal of ataraxia is at least one significant strand in his reaction to them. Ironically, Nietzsche uses the word 'happiness' (Glück) to refer to this and related ideals (although he uses it in other, very different ways as well);
and his attitude is well summed up in a remark about the English -but with the English utilitarians particularly in mind: 'Humanity does not strive for happiness; only the 23 For basic materials from both authors, see Warnock (2003) , Ryan (1987) . 24 I have discussed this in Bett (2000a) . A major reason for his ambivalence has to do with his attitude towards the notion of objective truth. In so far as the sceptics challenged anyone who claimed to have discovered the objective truth, Nietzsche finds them valuable allies. But in so far as the sceptics do not challenge the very concept of objective truth -on the contrary, in emphasizing the difficulties in pinning down how things really, objectively are, they take for granted that the concept itself makes sense -they do not meet with Nietzsche's approval; for the 'perspectivist' strand in Nietzsche's thought is precisely a challenge to the concept of objectivity itself.
English do' (Twilight of the Idols, Epigrams and Arrows, 12) 25 . But in fact it is not only the English whom he accuses of this boring and decadent goal. It is also, as I mentioned, the Greek sceptics, and in fact Greek philosophers in general since Socrates, despite other important differences he is prepared to recognize between them; Socrates, in his view, was responsible for a number of wrong turns in Greek philosophy, and the privileging of happiness (in the sense just referred to) was one of them. The most famous place in which this theme appears is perhaps 'The Problem of Socrates', the first major section of that it is those who avoid theory who are especially likely to be interested in cultivating an attitude of contentment. With a very broad brush he criticizes both scepticism and numerous theory-laden philosophies, both ancient and modern, for treating precisely this kind of attitude as an ideal. Now it is also true, of course, that Nietzsche himself is deeply suspicious of philosophical theorizing; and this is part of why, in other respects, he finds the Greek sceptics much more congenial 27 . But this in turn, as has been widely recognized, gives a peculiar status to his own ideal of life. For Nietzsche, a life that is going well is one in which risks are taken, strength of some kind is exerted, and 25 I use the translation from Nietzsche (1997) . I have discussed Nietzsche's various conceptions of happiness, his view of its place in Greek philosophy, and the relation between this and his attitude to the utilitarians, in Bett (2008) . 26 The abbreviation KSA refers to Nietzsche (1980) 
